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Abstract
This paper develops an equilibrium model of vertical mergers. We show that com-
petition on an upstream market between integrated firms only is less intense than in the
presence of unintegrated upstream firms. Indeed, when an integrated firm supplies the
upstream market, it becomes a soft downstream competitor to preserve its upstream
profits. This benefits other integrated firms, which may therefore choose not to cut
prices on the upstream market. This mechanism generates waves of vertical mergers
in which every upstream firm integrates with a downstream firm, and the remaining
unintegrated downstream firms obtain the input at a high upstream price. We show
that these anticompetitive vertical mergers waves are more likely when downstream
competition is fiercer.
1 Introduction
The anticompetitive effects of vertical mergers have long been a hotly debated issue among
economists. Until the end of the 1960s, the traditional vertical foreclosure theory was widely
accepted by antitrust practitioners. According to this theory, vertical mergers were harmful
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to competition, since vertically integrated firms had incentives to raise their rivals’ costs. This
view was seriously challenged by Chicago school authors in the 1970s, notably Bork (1978)
and Posner (1976), on the ground that firms cannot leverage market power from one market
to another. A more recent strategic approach of the subject, initiated by Ordover, Saloner
and Salop (1990) and Hart and Tirole (1990), shows how vertical integration might relax
competition. A number of papers has established that vertical mergers have anticompetitive
effects under some specific assumptions including extra commitment power for vertically
integrated firms (Ordover, Saloner and Salop, 1990), choice of input specification (Choi and
Yi, 2000), switching costs (Chen, 2001), tacit collusion (Nocke and White, 2007), exclusive
dealing (Chen and Riordan, 2007).
In this paper we show that vertical mergers can be harmful to competition even in the
absence of such assumptions. More precisely, a wave of vertical mergers that eliminates
all the unintegrated upstream firms may lead to a monopoly-like outcome on the upstream
market. This is because competition on the upstream market between vertically integrated
firms only – a market structure the literature has surprisingly overlooked – can be ineffective.
In our model there are initially two upstream firms and three downstream firms. First,
the downstream firms bid to integrate backward with the first upstream firm. Then, if a
merger has taken place, the remaining unintegrated downstream firms bid to acquire the
second upstream firm. Upstream firms (integrated or not) then compete in prices to sell the
intermediate input to the remaining unintegrated downstream firms. Finally, downstream
firms (integrated or not) compete in prices with differentiated products. The upstream
market exhibits the usual ingredients of tough competition: upstream firms compete in prices,
produce a perfectly homogeneous upstream good and incur the same constant marginal cost.
When there has been zero or one vertical merger, the standard Bertrand logic applies and
upstream competition drives the upstream price to the marginal cost.
When two mergers have taken place, however, the Bertrand logic can collapse. The
intuition is following. There are now two vertically integrated firms, called U1 − D1 and
U2−D2, and one unintegrated downstream firm, called D3. Assume that U1−D1 sells the
intermediate input to D3 at a strictly positive price-cost margin, and consider the incentives
of its integrated rival U2 − D2 to corner the upstream market. Notice first that, when
U1 − D1 increases its downstream price, it recognizes that some of the final consumers it
loses will eventually purchase from D3, thereby increasing upstream demand and revenues.
Therefore, supplying the upstream market strengthens an integrated firm’s incentives to be
a soft competitor on the downstream market; we refer to this effect as the softening effect.
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The softening effect benefits U2 −D2, which faces a less aggressive competitor on the final
market. Now, if U2 − D2 undercuts U1 − D1 on the upstream market and becomes the
upstream supplier, then U1 − D1 stops being a softening competitor on the downstream
market. To sum up, integrated firm U2 − D2 faces the following trade-off when deciding
whether to undercut: on the one hand, undercutting yields upstream profits; on the other
hand, it makes integrated firm U1−D1 more aggressive on the downstream market. When
the latter effect dominates, the incentives to undercut vanish and the Bertrand logic collapses.
We exhibit equilibria in which there are two vertical mergers, one of integrated firm
charges its monopoly upstream price, and its integrated rival decides rationally to make no
upstream offer. These monopoly-like equilibria, when they exist, Pareto-dominate all other
equilibria from the integrated firms’ point of view. They are also the only equilibria which do
not involve weakly dominated strategies. Besides, we show that partial foreclosure equilibria
degrade both social welfare and consumers’ surplus.
Using linear demand functions, we show that downstream competition is fiercer, the
weaker competition on the upstream market. Intuitively, when downstream products are
good substitutes, the softening effect is strong since a firm’s downstream price has a large
impact on its rivals’ demands. Thus, undercutting on the upstream market is not profitable
and the monopoly-like outcome is an equilibrium. Conversely, when downstream products
are strongly differentiated, the softening effect is weak and undercutting on the upstream
market is always profitable.
Our analysis can shed light on the recent wave of vertical mergers in the satellite nav-
igation industry. The only two (upstream) firms that provide navigable digital maps, Tele
Atlas and Navteq, have been acquired by, respectively, (downstream) TomTom and Nokia.
TomTom embed digital maps in its portable navigation devices, Nokia in its mobile hand-
sets with navigation possibilities. Our model suggests that, as long as mobile phones and
portable navigation devices remain rather imperfect substitutes, competition between digital
map providers should not be harmed. However, when these products become increasingly
substitutes over time, as it is envisaged by the European Commission, the softening effect
should strengthen and upstream competition might weaken.
Our paper contributes to the literature on the competitive effects of vertical mergers. A
strand of the literature can be summarized in a common framework with two upstream firms,
two downstream firms, and price competition on both markets.1 Ordover, Saloner and Salop
1Exceptions include an early contribution by Salinger (1988) who considers Cournot competition on both
markets, and the strand of the literature initiated by Hart and Tirole (1990) which analyzes the consequences
of upstream secret offers and focuses mainly on the commitment problem faced by an upstream monopolist.
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(1990) show that a vertical integration raises the upstream price when the integrated firm
can commit to exiting the upstream market and letting the remaining unintegrated upstream
firm monopolize the upstream market. As pointed out by Reiffen (1992), their analysis relies
crucially on the assumption that the merged entity has a strong commitment power. Choi
and Yi (2000) provide foundations for this commitment power through the choice of input
specification. Nocke and White (2007) and Normann (2009) provide another justification for
the commitment assumption; they show that the commitment can be enforced in an infinitely
repeated game through tacit collusion, and that a vertical merger facilitates the enforcement
of the commitment. Chen and Riordan (2007) argue that vertical integration and exclusive
contracts complement each other to implement partial foreclosure.
The softening effect that shows up in our model has been unveiled by Chen (2001).2,3
He shows that when there is one vertical merger, the remaining downstream firm prefers
purchasing the input from the integrated firm than from the unintegrated upstream firm
in order to benefit from the softening effect. If there are upstream cost asymmetries and
upstream switching costs, then the unintegrated upstream firm is unable to undercut the
integrated firm on the upstream market and there is partial foreclosure in equilibrium. Our
result is different. We show that in the two-merger situation the integrated rival is able to
undercut since we assume away any cost differential or switching cost, but it is not willing
to do so. Our result supports the classical analysis of Ordover, Saloner and Salop (1990), for
we show that no commitment is actually necessary to sustain the monopoly outcome when
the softening effect is strong enough.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. We solve the
upstream-downstream competition subgames in Section 3 and the vertical integration game
in Section 4. We present several extensions and robustness checks in Section 5 and conclude
in Section 6 by discussing the recent wave of vertical mergers in the satellite navigation
industry.
2 Model
We consider a vertically related industry with two identical upstream firms, U1 and U2,
and three symmetric downstream firms, D1, D2 and D3. The upstream firms produce an
homogeneous input at constant marginal cost m and supply it to the downstream firms. The
2Chen (2001) refers to it as the collusive effect. We adopt a different terminology to make it clear that
the softening effect does not involve any form of tacit or overt collusion.
3See also Fauli-Oller and Sandonis (2002) for an application of the softening effect in a licensing context.
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downstream firms transform the intermediate input into a differentiated final product on a
one-to-one basis at zero cost. The input can also be obtained from an alternative source at
a constant marginal cost m > m.4
The demand for downstream firm Di’s product, i = 1, 2, 3, is qi(p1, p2, p3), where pj
denotes Dj’s price. The demand addressed to a firm is decreasing in its own price and
increasing in its competitors’ prices: ∂qi/∂pi ≤ 0 (with a strict inequality if qi > 0) and
∂qi/∂pj ≥ 0 (with a strict inequality if qi > 0 and qj > 0), for i 6= j in {1, 2, 3}. We
assume that these demand functions are twice continuously differentiable. Symmetry between
downstream firms implies that Di’s demand can be written as qi = q(pi, p−i), where p−i
denotes the set of prices charged by Di’s rivals and q(., .) is the same for all downstream
firms.
We now describe the four-stage game played by the firms. In the first stage, the three
downstream firms can bid to acquire upstream firm U1. In the second stage, if a merger has
occurred, the remaining unintegrated downstream firms can counter it by bidding to integrate
backward with U2. In the third stage, each upstream firm (integrated or not) Ui, i = 1, 2,
announces the price wi at which it is ready to supply any unintegrated downstream firm.
5,6
Unintegrated downstream firms then choose from which upstream producer to purchase.
Downstream prices are set in the fourth stage. Unintegrated downstream firms are allowed
to switch to another upstream supplier at zero cost once downstream prices are set, if this
is strictly profitable.7 To avoid trivial situations, we also consider that a firm decides to
merge if it is strictly preferred. This would obviously be the case whenever mergers involve
transaction costs. We look for subgame-perfect pure strategy Nash equilibria.
For all the market structures studied in this article and for i in {1, 2, 3}, we denote by
pii the total profit made by Di (including the profit made by its upstream subsidiary if it is
integrated). We make the following assumptions:
(i) Firms’ best responses on the downstream market are unique and defined by the first
order conditions ∂pii/∂pi = 0.
4This assumption is also made, e.g., by Ordover, Saloner and Salop (1990) and Hart and Tirole (1990).
We relax it in Section 5. The alternative source of supply can come from a competitive fringe of inefficient
upstream firms.
5The internal transfer price for a vertically integrated firm is irrelevant since it cancels out in the expression
of its total profit.
6Notice that discrimination is not possible on the upstream market and that only linear tariffs are used.
We relax these assumptions in Section 5.
7As we explain in Section 5, this assumption simplifies the analysis by ensuring that downstream firms
always buy the input from the cheapest supplier. This is in contrast to Chen (2001), in which upstream
switching costs, together with an upstream cost asymmetry, generate anticompetitive vertical mergers.
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(ii) There exists a unique Nash equilibrium on the downstream market.
(iii) Prices are strategic complements: for all i 6= j in {1, 2, 3}, ∂2pii/∂pi∂pj ≥ 0.
Assumption (i) together with (iii) implies that the best response function of a firm is increas-
ing in its rivals’ prices. Combining (ii) with (iii), we also get that the unique downstream
equilibrium is stable.8 Finally, we assume that m is a relevant outside option: whatever the
market structure, an unintegrated downstream firm earns strictly positive profits if it buys
the intermediate input at a price lower than or equal to m.
3 Upstream-Downstream Equilibrium
3.1 Upstream-Downstream Equilibrium With No Merger
Consider that no merger has taken place. Since downstream firms can switch to another
supplier at zero cost after downstream prices are set, they always eventually buy from the
cheapest supplier. Consequently the upstream equilibrium features both unintegrated up-
stream firms charging m and making no profit. The three downstream firms compete on a
level playing field and earn the same profit, denoted by pi∗.9
Lemma 1. When no merger has taken place, the unique equilibrium outcome on the upstream
market is the Bertrand outcome: w1 = w2 = m.
3.2 Upstream-Downstream Equilibrium With One Merger
We now consider that exactly one vertical merger has taken place. Without loss of generality,
we assume that D1 has merged with U1 to form integrated firm U1−D1. We establish that
the upstream market is supplied at marginal cost in equilibrium.
First, it cannot be that both unintegrated downstream firms purchase the upstream good
from U1−D1 at price w1 > m, or from the alternative source of input at m. Otherwise U2
would obviously undercut since the upstream market is its sole source of profit.
Conversely, if U2 serves the upstream market at price w2 > m, then U1 −D1 is willing
to undercut. First, this brings in upstream profits. Second, becoming the upstream supplier
modifies the downstream outcome in a way that is, as we now show, profitable to U1−D1.
Consider indeed that downstream firms D2 and D3 buy the input at an upstream price
8See Vives (1999), p.54.
9Formally, pi∗ = (p∗ −m)q(p∗, p∗, p∗), where p∗ = argmaxp(p−m)q(p, p∗, p∗).
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w > m. If U2 is their upstream supplier, the profits are given by pi1 = (p1 − m)q1 and
pij = (pj − w)qj, for j ∈ {2, 3}. If they purchase from U1 − D1, the profit of U1 − D1
becomes pi1 = (p1 − m)q1 + (w − m)q2 + (w − m)q3 and the profits of D2 and D3 are
unchanged. Moving from the former to the latter situation, U1−D1’s first order condition
shifts from
q1 + (p1 −m)∂q1
∂p1
= 0
to
q1 + (p1 −m)∂q1
∂p1
+ (w −m)∂q2
∂p1
+ (w −m)∂q3
∂p1
= 0.
Then its best response function moves upwards. As already pointed out by Chen (2001), when
U1−D1 supplies the upstream market, it realizes that any customer lost on the downstream
market may be recovered via the upstream market. This provides it with additional incentives
to raise its price. Strategic complementarity, in turn, leads D2 and D3 to charge higher prices
as well. At the end of the day, all downstream prices are higher when U1−D1 becomes the
upstream supplier, and in particular those of D2 and D3. This makes U1−D1 better off on
the downstream market.
This mechanism has a fat-cat flavor (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1984): being the upstream
supplier and thus a soft downstream competitor, U1 −D1 relaxes downstream competition
thanks to strategic complementarity. Moreover, the soft behavior of U1 − D1 benefits its
downstream rivals. In the following, we shall refer to the consequences of U1 − D1’s soft
behavior as the softening effect.
Finally, the upstream market cannot be shared between U1−D1 and U2 at w1 = w2 > m
neither, since both unintegrated downstream firms would prefer purchasing the intermediate
input from U1 − D1 to benefits from the softening effect. It is also straightforward to see
that the upstream market cannot be supplied at a price w < m, and we obtain the following
lemma.
Lemma 2. When exactly one merger has taken place, the unique equilibrium outcome on the
upstream market is the Bertrand outcome: w1 = w2 = m.
Proof. See Appendix A.2
In equilibrium, all firms obtain the input at the same price m, and there are no upstream
profits. Since downstream competition is not modified with respect to the no-merger case,
the three downstream firms earn the same profits: pi1 = pi2 = pi3 = pi
∗.
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3.3 Upstream-Downstream Equilibrium With Two Mergers
In this section we assume that two vertical mergers have taken place. Let us suppose, without
loss of generality, that D1 has merged with U1, and D2 has merged with U2, giving birth to
two integrated firms U1−D1 and U2−D2.
U1 − D1 and U2 − D2 compete to sell the input to unintegrated downstream firm D3.
Since D3 can obtain the input at cost m and always chooses the cheapest supplier, any
upstream offer strictly above m is equivalent to no offer. The strategy space on the upstream
market can therefore be restricted to [0,m] ∪ {+∞}, where an infinite price stands for no
offer.
There is no equilibrium in which firm D3 obtains the input from the alternative supplier.
Otherwise a vertically integrated firm would undercut to get upstream profits and relax
competition on the downstream market through the softening effect. Therefore, the deter-
mination of the upstream equilibrium only requires to analyze the downstream equilibrium
when firm D3 is supplied by a vertically integrated firm.
Downstream equilibrium. We assume, without loss of generality, that firm D3 purchases
the input from firm U1−D1 at price w ∈ [0,m]. The profit functions can be written as
pi1 = (p1 −m)q1 + (w −m)q3, (1)
pi2 = (p2 −m)q2, (2)
pi3 = (p3 − w)q3. (3)
The equilibrium downstream prices, denoted by pi(w) for i in {1, 2, 3}, solve the set of first
order conditions
q1 + (p1 −m)∂q1
∂p1
+ (w −m)∂q3
∂p1
= 0, (4)
q2 + (p2 −m)∂q2
∂p2
= 0, (5)
q3 + (p3 − w)∂q3
∂p3
= 0. (6)
We also denote by pii(w) the equilibrium profits. Last, define pii(+∞) the equilibrium profits
when D3 gets the input from the alternative source.
The comparison of the first order conditions of both vertically integrated firms indicates
that the upstream supplier has more incentives to raise its downstream price. This is again
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the softening effect. When U1−D1 charges a higher downstream price, some of the customers
it loses will eventually purchase from D3, which increases its upstream revenues. Together
with the stability of the downstream equilibrium, this implies that upstream supplier U1−D1
ends up charging a higher downstream price than U2−D2.
Firm U2−D2 benefits from firm U1−D1’s being a soft competitor on the downstream
market. As a result, it earns larger downstream profits than the upstream supplier. These
insights are summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 3. If w > m, then U1 − D1 charges a strictly higher downstream price and earns
strictly lower downstream profits than U2−D2,
p1(w) > p2(w), (7)
(p1(w)−m)q1(p1(w), p2(w), p3(w)) < (p2(w)−m)q2(p1(w), p2(w), p3(w)). (8)
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
An important consequence of this result is that we cannot tell unambiguously which of the
integrated firms earns more total profits. On the one hand, the upstream supplier extracts
revenues from the upstream market, on the other hand, its integrated rival benefits from
larger downstream profits thanks to the softening effect. It may well be that the latter effect
is strong enough to outweigh the upstream profit effect and make U2−D2 earn more total
profits than its rival.
Upstream equilibrium. There is an equilibrium in which firm U1 − D1 offers w1 ≤ m
and U2−D2 offers w2 ≥ w1 if, and only if, the upstream supplier does not want to serve the
upstream market at another price
pi1(w1) ≥ max
w<w2,w≤m
pi1(w),
nor to exit the upstream market
pi1(w1) ≥ pi2(w2),
and its vertically integrated rival is not willing to undercut
pi2(w1) ≥ max
w<w1
pi1(w).
Note that w2 can be infinite in the above expressions.
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This set of necessary and sufficient conditions generally characterize multiple equilibria.
As common sense suggests, there always exists an upstream equilibrium in which the input
is priced at its marginal cost.
Lemma 4. When two mergers have taken place, the Bertrand outcome on the upstream
market is an equilibrium outcome.
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
However, partial foreclosure equilibria with an upstream price strictly above marginal cost
can also exist. Consider that firm U1 −D1 supplies the upstream market at the monopoly
upstream price wm = argmaxw≤m pi1(w).10 wm is the price that a vertically integrated
firm would charge if, for an exogenous reason, its integrated rival had made no upstream
offer. As formally shown in Appendix A.5, it satisfies wm > m since charging an upstream
price strictly above the marginal cost brings in upstream profits and relaxes downstream
competition thanks to the softening effect and strategic complementarity.
Consider the incentives of U2 − D2 to corner the upstream market. On the one hand,
this would generate upstream revenues. On the other hand, U1 − D1 would stop being a
soft downstream competitor, which would lower U2−D2’s downstream profits by Lemma 3.
When the latter effect dominates the former, the proposed monopoly-like outcome on the
upstream market is an equilibrium.
Proposition 1. When two mergers have taken place, there is an equilibrium in which one
integrated firm proposes wm and the other integrated firm makes no offer if, and only if,
pi1(wm) ≤ pi2(wm). (9)
From the integrated firms’ point of view, these monopoly-like equilibria, when they exist,
• Pareto-dominate all other equilibria,
• are the only equilibria involving no weakly dominated strategies.
Proof. See Appendix A.6.
When the softening effect is large enough so that condition (9) holds, the hypothetical
situation in which one of the integrated firm has exogenously exited the upstream market,
10We assume, without loss of generality, that this price is unique. Defining wm as max{argmaxw≤m pi1(w)},
our results would still hold if pi1(.) reached its maximum for several values of w.
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granting a monopoly position to the other integrated firm, is an equilibrium. This might
sound somewhat tautological. Yet, our contribution is to show that condition (9) may well
be satisfied, because losers on the upstream market become winners on the downstream
market. Note also that monopoly-like equilibria come by pairs since the upstream supplier
can be either U1−D1 or U2−D2.
Proposition 1 gives foundations to the classical analysis of Ordover, Saloner and Salop
(1990), in which a vertically integrated firm commits to exiting the upstream market in order
to let the upstream rival charge the monopoly price. We show that no commitment is actually
necessary when the upstream rival is integrated, provided that the softening effect is strong
enough.
All other equilibria feature both vertically integrated firms setting the same upstream
price (and only one of them actually supplying the market). Such an outcome is part of
an equilibrium only if the softening effect and the upstream upstream profit effect exactly
cancel out, so that the upstream supplier earns as much profits as the vertically integrated
firm which does not supply the upstream market. Formally: pi1(w) = pi2(w). The Bertrand
outcome is one such symmetric equilibrium. Other symmetric equilibria can also feature an
upstream price strictly above m, as well as strictly below m.11
This multiplicity of equilibria can be resolved using standard selection criteria. First, the
monopoly-like equilibria Pareto-dominate all the symmetric equilibria from the integrated
firms’ standpoint. Indeed, the upstream price in a symmetric equilibrium is always smaller
than wm, otherwise one of the vertically integrated firm would set wm. This implies that,
in the symmetric equilibria, the vertically integrated firms earn less than pi1(wm), which is
lower than pi2(wm).
Second, the monopoly-like equilibria are the only equilibria involving no weakly dominated
strategies. In particular, any symmetric equilibrium strategy is weakly dominated by wm.
Therefore, it seems reasonable to think that integrated firms will coordinate on one of the
monopoly-like equilibria.
11When w < m, upstream profits are negative and the softening effect is reversed, with the upstream
supplier adopting an aggressive stance on the downstream market to limit its upstream losses.
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4 Equilibrium Vertical Mergers
4.1 Anticompetitive Mergers Wave
In monopoly-like equilibria the profits of the two merged entities are strictly larger than
the profit of the remaining unintegrated firm. Therefore, when a monopoly-like outcome
is expected to emerge after two mergers, downstream firms all bid to get a share of the
profit created by the mergers. Then, a wave of vertical mergers occurs that eliminates all
unintegrated upstream firms and implements the monopoly-like outcome.12
Although standard selection criteria indicate that the monopoly-like equilibria are likely
to emerge when they exist, extra-model considerations may modify that presumption. For
instance, a firm may have troubles with the competition authority, it may try to drive some
of its rivals out of business, or it may be willing to develop a reputation of tough competitor.
Besides, the Bertrand outcome is always an equilibrium of the upstream market by Lemma
4. Therefore, if we use no selection criterion, there always exists an anticipation scheme that
leads to an equilibrium with no merger. This discussion is summarized in
Proposition 2. There always exists an equilibrium with no merger.
If pi1(wm) ≤ pi2(wm) and integrated firms
• do not play weakly dominated strategies on the upstream market
• or do not play equilibria that are Pareto-dominated by another equilibrium,
then, in equilibrium, there are two mergers and the upstream market is supplied at the
monopoly price.
Proof. See Appendix A.7.
We argue that a wave of vertical mergers that leads to partial foreclosure of the remain-
ing downstream firm hurts consumers and lowers social welfare. Indeed, when the upstream
price increases above the marginal cost in the two-merger subgame, the best response func-
tions of U1 −D1 and D3 shift upwards, which increases all downstream prices by strategic
complementarity. This is clearly detrimental to all consumers. This also degrades social wel-
fare, since the total demand is already too low in the Bertrand outcome because of positive
markups on the downstream market.
12We do not discuss the equilibrium bids, since they depend strongly on the assumption that upstream
firms have all the bargaining power.
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Proposition 3. Consumers’ surplus and social welfare are strictly lower in an equilibrium
with a mergers wave and partial foreclosure of the remaining downstream firm than in an
equilibrium with no merger.
Proof. See Appendix A.8.
4.2 Tension Between Upstream and Downstream Competition
We now present an example to illustrate when condition (9) is satisfied. The demand ad-
dressed to downstream firm i ∈ {1, 2, 3} is given by qi(pi, p−i) = 1−pi−γ(pi−(p1+p2+p3)/3),
where γ ≥ 0 parameterizes the degree of differentiation between final products, which can
be interpreted as the intensity of downstream competition. Perfect competition corresponds
to γ approaching infinity and local monopolies to γ = 0. The upstream cost m is equal
to zero, and the cost of the alternative source of input m is high enough not to constrain
the monopoly upstream price of a vertically integrated firm. We solve the model with this
specification and find that
Proposition 4. In the linear case, there exists γ > 0, such that, if γ > γ, there exist exactly
four upstream equilibria in the two-merger subgame
• two monopoly-like equilibria (wm,+∞) and (+∞, wm),
• one symmetric equilibrium (ws, ws) with ws > m,
• the Bertrand equilibrium (m,m),
and there are two mergers in equilibrium if integrated firms do not play weakly dominated
strategies on the upstream market, or do not play equilibria that are Pareto-dominated by
another equilibrium.
If γ < γ, the Bertrand outcome is the only upstream equilibrium in the two-merger sub-
game, and there is no merger in equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix A.9.
Proposition 4 unveils a tension between competition on the downstream market and com-
petition on the upstream market. When the downstream market features fierce competition
(high γ), there exist monopoly-like equilibria on the upstream market, while the upstream
market is perfectly competitive when downstream competition is weak (low γ). To grasp
the intuition, suppose that the upstream market is supplied at the monopoly upstream price.
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When the substitutability between final products is strong, the integrated firm which supplies
the upstream market is reluctant to set too low a downstream price since this would strongly
contract its upstream profit. The other integrated firm benefits from a substantial softening
effect and, as a result, is not willing to corner the upstream market. The reverse holds when
downstream products are strongly differentiated.
4.3 Pro-Competitive Single Merger
In this section we show that pro-competitive one-merger equilibria can arise. Assume that the
monopoly-like outcome on the upstream market is an equilibrium of the two-merger subgame,
and that it is played in some two-merger subgames only: the monopoly-like equilibrium is
played if D1 merges with U1 and D2 merges with U2; the Bertrand equilibrium prevails in
every other two-merger subgame. Then, D3 may merge in the first stage in order to avoid
a wave of mergers involving D1 and D2 that would lead to its partial foreclosure. This
one-merger situation is an equilibrium under the two following conditions. First, if D1 wins
the first stage auction, then D2 wins the second stage auction. This occurs when D2’s gain
from merging is larger than D3’s loss from not merging: pi2(wm)−pi∗ ≥ pi∗−pi3(wm). Second,
D3 wins the first stage auction, which occurs when its loss from not merging is larger than
D1’s gain from merging: pi∗ − pi3(wm) ≥ pi1(wm)− pi∗.13 These conditions hold in the linear
example of Section 4.2 with concave downstream costs.14
In antitrust parlance, firm D3 is a maverick competitor: it will never accept to implement
a non-competitive equilibrium. If the maverick is sufficiently harmed when its rivals merge
and implement a partial foreclosure equilibrium, it can vertically integrate to ensure tough
competition on the upstream market. In that case, the potential maverick becomes an
effective maverick by preventing an anticompetitive wave of mergers.
13There exist one-merger equilibria under weaker conditions, although they are supported by least natural
anticipations schemes. For instance, if D1 wins the first auction, and if D2 or D3 wins the subsequent
auction, then a monopoly-like outcome is implemented with U1 − D1 being the upstream supplier; in any
other two-merger subgame, the Bertrand equilibrium is played. D2 and D3 have a lot to lose if they let D1
win the first auction, since they have to engage in a fierce bidding war in the subsequent auction to avoid
partial foreclosure. As a result they have incentives to prevent the first merger. They can do so if the loss
they incur following the first merger is higher than the gain captured by firm D1: pi∗−pi3(wm) ≥ pi1(wm)−pi∗.
The condition pi2(wm)− pi∗ ≥ pi∗ − pi3(wm) does need to be satisfied.
14The model is written with zero downstream cost, but all the results easily extend to the case of any twice
differentiable downstream cost function.
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5 Extensions and Robustness Checks
Two-part tariffs. We show that partial foreclosure equilibria with positive upstream prof-
its still exist in the two-merger subgame when two-part tariffs are used on the upstream
market. Denote by wi (respectively, Fi) the variable (respectively, the fixed) part of the
tariff. In a monopoly-like outcome, U1−D1 sets the variable part which maximizes the sum
of its profit and D3’s profit, i.e., wtp = argmaxw pi1(w) + pi3(w) which is strictly larger than
m by strategic complementarity,15 while U2 − D2 makes no upstream offer. The fixed fee
captures D3’s profit, i.e., F1 = pi3(wtp). This is an equilibrium provided that U2−D2 does
not want to undercut: pi1(wtp) + pi3(wtp) ≤ pi2(wtp). When this inequality is not satisfied,
there exists a symmetric equilibrium in which both integrated firms charge the variable part
wtp and a fixed fee equal to pi2(wtp) − pi1(wtp), which makes them indifferent between sup-
plying the upstream demand or not.16 In both cases, the upstream profit is strictly positive
and integrated firms’ profits are strictly higher than in the Bertrand outcome.
No alternative source of input. When there is no alternative source of input, the
monopoly upstream price is defined as wm = argmaxw≥0 pi1(w). If wm < +∞, then, our
results are not affected at all: there exists an equilibrium with a wave of vertical mergers
and a monopoly-like outcome on the upstream market when pi1(wm) ≤ pi2(wm). On the other
hand, if wm = +∞, then, there exists an equilibrium in the two-merger subgame, in which
both integrated firms choose to make no upstream offer to the unintegrated downstream firm.
In that case, there is an equilibrium with an anticompetitive wave of mergers in which the
remaining unintegrated downstream firm is completely foreclosed.
Upstream switching costs. In the model downstream firms can switch upstream supplier
at no cost after downstream prices are set. This assumption makes clear that our results do
not hinge on upstream switching costs as in Chen (2001). However, it leads to a unnatural
timing since an unintegrated downstream firm chooses its input supplier after it sets its
price. Consider now that unintegrated downstream firms elect their upstream suppliers
before the downstream competition stage. Obviously, the analysis is not modified in the
15See Bonanno and Vickers (1988).
16When pi2(wtp) < pi1(wtp) the equilibrium fixed fee is strictly negative. In that case the upstream contract
features exclusive dealing, otherwise D3 accepts both contracts to pocket the fixed fees. If exclusive contracts
are prohibited and pi2(wtp) < pi1(wtp), then the proposed equilibrium cannot be implemented, and the only
equilibrium outcome becomes the Bertrand outcome. This is reminiscent to Chen and Riordan (2007) who
show that vertical integration and exclusive contracts complement each other to achieve an anticompetitive
effect.
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zero-merger and two-merger subgames. In the one-merger subgame, we cannot exclude the
following pathological equilibrium. Integrated firm U1 − D1 sets the upstream price w1,
and unintegrated upstream firm U2 sets the upstream price w2, where w1 and w2 are their
monopoly upstream prices when each one of them supplies one unintegrated downstream
firm.17 w1 > w2, which makes sense, since an integrated firm has more incentives than an
unintegrated upstream firm to charge a high upstream price. D2 purchases from U1 − D1
to make the integrated firm less aggressive on the final market, while D3 buys from U2 to
benefit from a lower upstream price. This equilibrium seems rather unlikely, and we have
not been able to find one such example using standard specifications, then it seems safe to
say that our results do not rely crucially on the timing of the game.
Discrimination on the upstream market. Consider that discrimination is allowed on
the upstream market. Obviously, this does not change the outcome of the upstream price
competition stage in the zero-merger and two-merger subgames. In the one-merger subgame,
we cannot exclude the following pathological equilibrium. Integrated firm U1−D1 offers its
monopoly price w1 to unintegrated downstream firm D2, and unintegrated upstream firm
U2 offers its monopoly price w2 to unintegrated downstream firm D3, where w1 and w2 are
defined in footnote 17. U2 prefers not to make an acceptable offer to D2, since, if that
offer were eventually accepted, integrated U1 − D1 would become more aggressive on the
downstream market, which would erode the profit earned by U2 on D3. Similarly, U1−D1
prefers not to make an acceptable offer to D3, since, if that offer were accepted, U1 − D1
would become less aggressive on the downstream market. By strategic complementarity, D2
would increase its downstream price as well, which could lower its demand, and hence, the
upstream profit that U1−D1 makes on D2. Since this equilibrium is rather unrealistic and
does not show up in standard specifications, our analysis seems also robust to discrimination
on the upstream market.
Quantity competition. The softening effect exists if the upstream supplier can enhance
its upstream profits by behaving softly on the downstream market. One may wonder whether
the softening effect hinges on the assumption of price competition on the downstream market,
for if the downstream strategic variables are quantities and all firms play simultaneously,
then the upstream supplier can no longer impact its upstream profit through its downstream
17Formally, w1 = argmaxw˜1 piU1−D1(w˜1, w2) and w2 = argmaxw˜2 piU2(w1, w˜2), where pii(w˜1, w˜2) denotes
the profit of firm i when firms D2 and D3 supplied by firms U1−D1 and U2, respectively, at prices w˜1 and
w˜2.
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behavior. However, if for instance integrated firms are Stackelberg leaders on the downstream
market, then the upstream supplier’s quantity choice modifies its upstream profit, and the
softening effect is still at work.18 To summarize, the issue is not whether firms compete in
prices or in quantities, but whether the strategic choice of a firm can strategically affect its
rivals’ quantities on the downstream market.
Strategic interactions. We have assumed that downstream prices are strategic comple-
ments, in line with the vertical mergers literature. This is however not a crucial assumption.
On the contrary, we argue that strategic substitute prices would strengthen the softening
effect and thus increase the scope for anticompetitive waves of mergers. Let us informally
explain why, by considering the downstream competition stage when two mergers have oc-
curred and the upstream price is strictly above the marginal cost. The upstream supplier
has incentives to raise its downstream price to preserve its upstream profit. When prices are
strategic complements, the integrated rival best responds by raising its downstream price as
well, which reduces the gap between equilibrium downstream prices and weakens the soft-
ening effect. By contrast, when prices are strategic substitutes, the integrated rival lowers
its downstream price, which enlarges the gap between equilibrium downstream prices and
strengthens the softening effect.19
6 Conclusion
We show that upstream competition between integrated firms only is weaker than competition
between integrated firms and unintegrated upstream firms, or between unintegrated firms
only. This provides a rationale for the existence of anticompetitive waves of vertical mergers
in which every unintegrated upstream firm is eliminated.
Our analysis can shed light on the recent wave of vertical mergers in the satellite nav-
igation industry investigated by the European Commission.20 The upstream market is the
market for navigable digital map databases, where only Tele Atlas and Navteq are active,
with pre-merger market shares of approximately 50% each. At the downstream level, firms
embed digital maps in the devices they manufacture in order to provide their customers with
18With quantity competition and a linear demand function, if integrated firms are Stackelberg leaders on
the downstream market, then the monopoly-like outcome is an equilibrium and there is an anticompetitive
wave of mergers.
19We have confirmed numerically this intuition using the linear demand functions of Section 4.2 and
quadratic downstream costs to parameterize the sign of ∂2pii/∂pi∂pj , i 6= j.
20See European Commission COMP M.4854 TomTom/Tele Atlas and COMP M.4942 Nokia/Navteq.
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navigation solutions. Downstream firms include portable navigation device manufacturers
TomTom, Garmin and Mio Tech & Navman, and manufacturers of mobile handsets that in-
corporate navigation possibilities, Nokia, Motorola, Samsung, Sony Ericsson. The European
Commission does not consider portable navigation devices and mobile phones with naviga-
tion possibilities to be part of the same market yet, but envisages that, as technology evolves,
both markets will increasingly converge.
In October 2007, TomTom announces its acquisition of Tele Atlas; four months later Nokia
responds by announcing its acquisition of Navteq. The European Commission has given
clearance for these two mergers, thereby allowing the vertical integration of every upstream
firm. Our analysis suggests that, as long as mobile phones and portable navigation devices
remain rather imperfect substitutes, competition between digital map providers should not
be harmed. However, when the two markets converge as it is envisaged by the European
Commission, the softening effect should strengthen and upstream competition might weaken.
18
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A Appendix
A.1 A Preliminary Lemma
To ease the proofs of all lemmas and propositions, we begin by showing the following technical
lemma.
Lemma 0. If the best response function on the downstream market of at least one firm shifts
upwards, then all equilibrium downstream prices increase strictly.
Assume that firm i’s best response shifts upwards. This happens if, and only if, the first
derivative of its profit with respect to its price shifts upwards. For all j, let us denote by pi(0)j (.)
(respectively pi(1)j (.)) the profit of firm j before (resp. after) the marginal profit shift. The game
(R;pi(k)j (.), k = 0, 1; j = 1, 2, 3) is strictly supermodular. For all j, pi
(k)
j (pj , p−j) has increasing differ-
ences in (pj , k), and pi
(k)
i (pi, p−i) has strictly increasing differences in (pi, k). Since we assume that
every configuration analyzed in this paper yields a unique downstream equilibrium, supermodularity
theory (see Vives, 1999, p.35) tells us that this equilibrium is strictly increasing in k.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
First, if U1−D1 supplies the market at w > m, then U2 clearly wants to undercut.
Conversely, assume that U2 supplies the market at w > m, and let us show that U1−D1 wants
to undercut. If it becomes the upstream supplier at price (arbitrarily close to) w, its first order
condition on the downstream market shifts from q1+(p1−m)∂q1/∂p1 = 0 to q1+(p1−m)∂q1/∂p1+
(w −m)(∂q2/∂p1 + ∂q3/∂p1) = 0. Its best response function shifts upwards, while all other best
responses remain unaffected, then all downstream prices increase by Lemma 0. Therefore U1−D1’s
profit increases thanks to the upstream revenues and the softening of downstream competition.
Formally, denoting with superscript 1 (respectively 2) the outcome variables when firm U1 − D1
undercuts (resp. does not undercut):
pi
(2)
1 = p
(2)
1 q1(p
(2)
1 , p
(2)
2 , p
(2)
3 )
< p
(2)
1 q1(p
(2)
1 , p
(1)
2 , p
(1)
3 ) by Lemma 0
< p
(2)
1 q1(p
(2)
1 , p
(1)
2 , p
(1)
3 ) + (w −m)
(
q2(p
(2)
1 , p
(1)
2 , p
(1)
3 ) + q3(p
(2)
1 , p
(1)
2 , p
(1)
3 )
)
since w > m
< p
(1)
1 q1(p
(1)
1 , p
(1)
2 , p
(1)
3 ) + (w −m)
(
q2(p
(1)
1 , p
(1)
2 , p
(1)
3 ) + q3(p
(1)
1 , p
(1)
2 , p
(1)
3 )
)
by revealed preference
= pi(1)1 .
Then, we show that if firms U1−D1 and U2 propose the same upstream price w > m, then both
unintegrated downstream firms purchase from U1−D1, which shall proves that this situation cannot
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be an equilibrium since U2 would undercut. We have already seen that the best response function
of U1 − D1 shifts upwards when D3 buys U1 − D1 rather than U2, which raises all downstream
prices by Lemma 0 and makes D3 better off. Formally, denoting with superscript 1 (respectively 2)
the outcome variables when firm U1−D1 (resp. U2) supplies D3 at price w:
pi
(2)
3 = (p
(2)
3 − w)q3(p(2)1 , p(2)2 , p(2)3 )
< (p(2)3 − w)q3(p(1)1 , p(1)2 , p(2)3 ) since p(1)i > p(2)i for all i
< (p(1)3 − w)q3(p(1)1 , p(1)2 , p(1)3 ) by revealed preference
= pi(1)3 .
This implies that D3’s dominant strategy is to purchase from U1 − D1. By symmetry, this also
holds for D2.
It remains to prove that the upstream market cannot be supplied at a price below the marginal
cost. It is obvious that U2 never sells the input at w < m, otherwise it would be better off exiting
the market. Assume now that U1 − D1 is the upstream supplier at w < m, and denote U2’s
upstream offer by w′ ≥ w.21 U1−D1 is better off exiting the upstream market, since its shifts its
best response upwards, which strictly increases all the downstream prices by 0.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 3
Let w > m. To show that p1(w) > p2(w), we denote by B1(p2, p3, w) (respectively B2(p1, p3, w))
firm U1−D1 (resp. U2−D2)’s best response when the upstream market is supplied by U1−D1
at price w. The first order conditions (4) and (5) indicate that B1(., ., w) = B2(., ., w). Then
p1(w) = B1(p2(w), p3(w), w) > B2(p2(w), p3(w), w).
Besides
p2(w) = B2(p1(w), p3(w), w).
By strategic complementarity, B2 is increasing in its first argument, therefore p1(w) > p2(w).
A straightforward revealed preference argument shows that U1 − D1 earns a strictly lower
downstream profit than U2−D2.
A.4 Proof of Lemma 4
The only nontrivial point is that a downward deviation is not profitable: pi1(w) < pi1(m = for
w < m. The proof is along the line of the proof of Lemma 2. If an integrated firm sets w < m,
21Actually w′ < w. Indeed, if w′ = w, unintegrated downstream firms strictly prefer purchasing from D2
since it shifts U1−D1’s best response function upwards.
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then its best response function and the one of D3 shifts downwards, and all downstream prices
decreases by Lemma 0. Therefore, the downward deviation yields negative upstream profits and
reduces downstream profits.
A.5 Proof of wm > m
In the proof of Lemma 4, we have shown that pi1(w) < pi1(m) for w < m, which implies that
wm ≥ m. Moreover, taking the first derivative of pi1(.) for w = m, we get, using the envelope
theorem,
dpi1
dw
(m) = (p1 −m)
(
dp2
dw
(m)
∂q1
∂p2
(p1(m), p2(m), p3(m)) +
dp3
dw
(m)
∂q1
∂p3
(p1(m), p2(m), p3(m))
)
+ q3(p1(m), p2(m), p3(m)) > 0,
since the downstream prices are strictly increasing in w by Lemma 0.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 1
Assume that pi1(wm) ≤ pi2(wm) and let us show that (wm,+∞) is an equilibrium. Clearly, firm
U1−D1 does not want to set another price, by definition of wm. In addition, since pi1(wm) ≤ pi2(wm),
and again by definition of wm, firm U2−D2 does not want to undercut its rival.
Conversely, if pi1(wm) > pi2(wm), then monopoly-like outcomes cannot be equilibria, since the
integrated firm which does not supply the upstream market would rather undercut its rival.
To show that monopoly-like equilibria, when they exist, Pareto-dominate all other equilibria,
we first show that all other equilibria are symmetric. Notice first that pi2(.) is upward-sloping since,
by the envelope theorem,
dpi2
dw
= (p2 −m)
(
∂q2
∂p1
dp1
dw
+
∂q2
∂p3
dp3
dw
)
> 0
as downstream prices are strictly increasing in w. Let w1 6= wm and w2 > w1, and assume, by
contradiction, that (w1, w2) is an equilibrium. Then w2 ≤ wm, otherwise the upstream supplier
would rather set wm. If pi1(w1) > pi2(w1), then firm U2 − D2 has a strictly profitable deviation:
setting w1 − ε. If pi1(w1) ≤ pi2(w1), then pi1(w1) < pi2(w2) since pi2(.) is upward-sloping, and firm
U1−D1 has a strictly profitable deviation: setting w2 + ε. In both cases we get a contradiction.
Consider now a monopoly-like equilibrium (wm,+∞), and another equilibrium, which we know
is symmetric, (w,w). Obviously, pi1(w) = pi2(w), otherwise both firms would rather undercut or
exit the upstream market. Then we have, by definition of wm, pi2(w) = pi1(w) < pi1(wm) ≤ pi2(wm),
which proves that the monopoly-like equilibria Pareto-dominate all other equilibria.
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We now show that all other equilibria than the monopoly-like equilibria involve weakly dom-
inated strategies on the upstream market. We have just seen that these other equilibria are of
the form (w,w), with w < wm and pi1(w) = pi2(w). Let us show that offering wi = wm weakly
dominates offering wi = w for integrated firm i. If the integrated rival offers wj ≤ w, then both
strategy are equivalent. If w < wj < wm, then offering wm yields a payoff pi2(wj), which is larger
than the payoff when offering w, pi2(w), because pi2(.) is increasing. If wj > wm, then offering wm
yields a payoff pi1(wm), which is larger than the payoff when offering w, pi1(w), by definition of wm.
If wj = wm, the former two cases shows that it is also strictly preferable to offer wm than w.
A.7 Proof of Proposition 2
When the Bertrand outcome arises in every two-merger subgames, firms are indifferent between
merging or not. In that case, it is an equilibrium that downstream firms submit no bid.
We now show that there is two mergers in equilibrium if pi1(wm) ≤ pi2(wm), and integrated
firms do not play weakly dominated strategies on the upstream market or do not play equilibria
that are Pareto-dominated by another equilibrium. In that case, the only downstream equilibria
in the two-merger subgames are the two monopoly-like equilibria. It cannot be that there is only
zero or one merger in equilibrium, since any remaining downstream firm would rather bid a small
amount to vertically integrate and increase its profit from pi∗ to pi1(wm) or pi2(wm). Therefore, in
any equilibrium, there are two mergers and the input price is wm.
A.8 Proof of Proposition 3
We compare an equilibrium with two mergers in which D3 purchases the from U1−D1 at w > m,
with an equilibrium with no merger in which all downstream firms access the input at marginal cost.
First, all downstream prices are strictly higher in the partial foreclosure equilibrium by Lemma 0,
therefore consumers are strictly worse off.
Second, we show that social welfare in also strictly lower in the partial foreclosure equilibrium.
Assume that there exists a representative consumer with a quasi-linear, continuously differentiable
and quasi-concave utility function q0+u(q1, q2, q3), where q0 denotes consumption of the numeraire
and qk denotes consumption of product k ∈ {1, 2, 3}. We can then write the social welfare as
W (p1, p2, p3) = u (q1(p1, p2, p3), q2(p1, p2, p3), q3(p1, p2, p3))−m
3∑
k=1
qk(p1, p2, p3).
We have to show that W (p1(w), p2(w), p3(w)) − W (p1(m), p2(m), p3(m)), the variation in social
welfare when one shifts from the Bertrand outcome from the partial foreclosure outcome, is strictly
negative. Since the welfare function is symmetric in its arguments, we can relabel the downstream
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prices in the partial foreclosure equilibrium by {pˆ1, pˆ2, pˆ3} = {p1(w), p2(w), p3(w)} such as pˆ3 >
pˆ2 > pˆ1 > p1(m) = p2(m) = p3(m) ≡ p∗.22 The variation in welfare then writes as
∫ pˆ1
p∗
3∑
k=1
∂W
∂pk
(r, r, r)dr +
∫ pˆ2
pˆ1
3∑
k=2
∂W
∂pk
(pˆ1, r, r)dr +
∫ pˆ3
pˆ2
∂W
∂p3
(pˆ1, pˆ2, r)dr.
All the integrands are strictly negative. Indeed, for instance,
∂W
∂pk
(p1, p2, p3) =
3∑
k′=1
(
∂u
∂qk′
−m
)
∂qk′
∂pk
=
3∑
k′=1
(pk′ −m)∂qk
′
∂pk
is strictly negative when pk ≥ pk′ , k′ 6= k, since ∂qk/∂pk < −
∑
k′ 6=k |∂qk′/∂pk|. This concludes the
proof.
A.9 Proof of Proposition 4
In the two-merger subgame, when the upstream market is supplied by U1−D1 at price w, down-
stream prices are
p1(w) =
18 + γ(15 + w(9 + 5γ))
2(3 + γ)(6 + 5γ)
p2(w) =
3(6 + γ(5 + w + wγ))
2(3 + γ)(6 + 5γ)
p3(w) =
3(6 + 5γ) + w(18 + 7γ(3 + γ))
2(3 + γ)(6 + 5γ)
,
and profits
pi1(w) =
3(3 + γ)(6 + 5γ)2 + 6w(1 + γ)(6 + 5γ)(18 + γ(18 + 5γ))− w2(1 + γ)(648 + 1296γ + 909γ2 + 249γ3 + 20γ4)
4(3 + γ)2(6 + 5γ)2
,
pi2(w) =
3(3 + 2γ)(6 + γ(5 + w + wγ))2
4(3 + γ)2(6 + 5γ)2
,
pi3(w) =
3(3 + 2γ)(6 + 5γ − w(1 + γ)(6 + γ))2
4(3 + γ)2(6 + 5γ)2
.
pi1(.) is strictly concave and reaches its maximum value for
wm =
3(6 + 5γ)(18 + γ(18 + 5γ))
648 + 1296γ + 909γ2 + 249γ3 + 20γ4
.
pi3(.) is strictly decreasing and strictly positive if it purchases the input from the alternative source
at price wm. We assume that the price of the alternative source of input does not constrain the
monopoly upstream price, m > wm, and provides D3 with positive profits.
Straightforward computations indicate that pi2(w) ≥ pi1(w) if, and only, if w ∈ [m,ws], where
ws ≥ wm if, and only if, γ ≥ γ ' 41. The same holds with strict inequalities. As a result, the
only equilibrium outcome is the Bertrand outcome when γ < γ. When γ > γ, there are also the
22We do so since, in the general case, we cannot order the downstream prices of the unintegrated down-
stream firm and the upstream supplier.
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two monopoly-like equilibria (wm,+∞) and (+∞, wm), and a symmetric equilibrium (ws, ws) with
ws < wm. In that case, if integrated firms do not play weakly dominated strategies on the upstream
market or do not play equilibria that are Pareto-dominated by another equilibrium, then there are
two mergers in equilibrium and a monopoly-like outcome on the upstream market.
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